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Abstract
This paper examines the e¤ect on economic development of whether a countrys
policy makers adopt a long-term vision. We use a novel institutional variable that
indicates whether policy makers have a long-term strategic vision. However, the di¢-
culty in estimating a causal e¤ect is that long-term vision is endogenous to economic
development. Therefore, we use the future-time reference language variables intro-
duced in Chen (2013) as instrumental variables for long-term vision. To account for
endogeneity, the paper conducts two stage least squares estimations where the lan-
guage instruments are used in the rst stage to nd an exogenous source of variation
in long-term vision. The results show that long-term vision, instrumented by future-
time reference, explains cross country variations in economic development. These
results are robust even after the inclusion of control variables and after the exclusion
of outliers.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between long-term vision and economic development.
In other words, the paper explores the economic e¤ects of whether a countrys policy makers
have a long-term strategic vision and whether they can induce public and private agents
to act according to that vision. Adopting a long-term vision allows policy makers to be
forward looking, allows decision makers to plan ahead for the future, allows agencies to act
strategically, allows authorities to prepare in advance for future contingencies, and allows
private agents to take economic actions today that have future payo¤s such as saving,
investment, innovation and accumulation of human capital. These actions are known to
promote economic performance.
To measure long-term vision, the paper uses a novel estimate of institutional quality
compiled in the Institutional Proles Database. The variable is constructed from three
questions: Do public authorities adopt a long-term strategic vision? Is this vision shared
by society as a whole? Do authorities have the capacity to encourage public and private
actors to act in alignment of this vision? The main contribution of our paper is that it is the
rst attempt in the literature to estimate whether this institutional indicator, that captures
the adoption of long-term strategic vision, have an e¤ect on economic development.
However, the key di¢culty in determining a causal e¤ect of long-term vision on economic
development is that the former is endogenous to the latter. As much as long-term vision can
inuence the level of living standards, economic development can have an e¤ect on whether
agents and agencies in a country adopt a long-term vision as well. In more developed
countries, agents are more likely to be forward looking and to plan ahead to preserve their
high living standards, and authorities are more likely to take that into consideration in their
policy making. Therefore, to identify a causal e¤ect we have to nd some exogenous source
of variation in long-term vision. In other words, when we estimate the e¤ect of long-term
vision on economic development, we have to use instrumental variables. The instruments
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used in this paper are the indicators for the linguistic characteristics of languages introduced
in Chen (2013).
Chen (2013) examines whether speaking in a specic way about the future leads speak-
ers to take future-oriented actions. The argument is that languages that grammatically
separate the future and the present leads speakers to feel that the future is more distant.
This would a¤ect current economic behavior that has future consequences. On the other
hand, some languages grammatically equate the present and the future. Those speakers
would be more willing to prepare for a future which feels closer. Chen (2013) uses an indi-
cator that linguists refer to as future-time reference (FTR) which indicates how languages
mark the timing of events. The author separates languages into two categories: weak FTR
languages which associate the present and the future, and strong FTR languages which
separate the present from the future. For example, the German language allows for a rain
prediction by saying "Morgen regnet es" which translates into "It rains tomorrow," while
the English language requires the use of a future tense such as "It will rain tomorrow."
Thus, the German language would be an example of weak FTR, while the English language
would represent strong FTR. Chen (2013) nds that weak FTR languages that associate
the future and the present inuence speakers intertemporal choices. The speakers of such
languages save more, retire with more wealth, and adopt healthier lifestyles.
The ndings of Chen (2013) was also supported by experimental evidence. Sutter et
al. (2018) conduct an experiment to show that the language spoken by children is asso-
ciated with their ability to wait for a future reward. The experiment is conducted in a
bilingual Italian city where some children speak Italian, which grammatically separates the
future and the present, while others speak German, which refers to the future by using
the present tense. The authors nd that German-speaking children are more likely than
Italian-speaking ones to delay gratication in their experiment.
Thus, our papers second contribution is to use the FTR language indicators as instru-
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ments for long-term vision. The argument is that speakers of languages with weak FTR
have a long-term future-oriented vision which, in turn, may have an impact on economic
outcomes. We also do not expect that the level of economic development to have an e¤ect
on the characteristics of the language used in a country. Therefore, these indicators can
serve as appropriate instruments.
The paper conducts ordinary least squares estimations to ascertain the e¤ect of long-
term vision on economic development. The results show that the adoption of a long-term
vision has a statistically signicant positive association with economic development. These
results are robust even after the inclusion of additional control variables. To deal with
potential endogeneity, the paper also conducts two stage least squares estimations. The
second stage is a regression of economic development on long-term vision. In the rst
stage, future-time reference FTR is used as an instrument. The outcome of the analysis
conrms that long-term vision, instrumented by the FTR language indicators, signicantly
explain cross country variations in economic development. These results are also robust
after the inclusion of other control variables and after the exclusion of outliers. Finally, the
paper explores the channels of transmission from long-term vision to economic development.
The evidence shows that education and innovation serve as valid channels of transmission.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature sur-
vey, section 3 includes the detailed description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical
estimation, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and gures are included thereafter.
2 Literature
There is a new burgeoning literature that examines the e¤ect of certain linguistic char-
acteristics on economic outcomes. Some of these studies focus on the di¤erences between
languages in terms of their use of future tense, gender marking, pronomial expression and
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politeness distinctions.
Some studies focus on future time reference which is argued to have an e¤ect on speakers
intertemporal choices, on long term orientation, on economic performance and on corporate
decisions. For instance, Hubner and Vannoorenberghe (2015a) explore whether patience,
proxied by measures of time discounting and long-term orientation, is a determinant of
economic outcomes. Using weak FTR as an instrument, the authors provide evidence for
a positive association between patience and output per worker, total factor productivity,
innovation, and capital stock. Hubner and Vannoorenberghe (2015b) examine the e¤ect of
patience, instrumented by the FTR indicator, on ination. The authors show that more
patient countries have lower average ination rates. Falk et al. (2018) also show that weak
FTR is signicantly positively correlated with patience and trust.
Galor and Özak (2016) examine the association between pre-industrial agro-climatic
characteristics and the prevalence of long-term orientation today. The authors nd a neg-
ative association between strong FTR and long-term orientation. Galor et al. (2017) nd
a favorable e¤ect of speaking a language with periphrastic future tense, associated with
long-term orientation, on college attendance. Figlio et al. (2019) study the role of long-
term orientation, using FTR as one measure, on the educational attainment of immigrant
students. The authors nd that students from long-term oriented cultures perform better,
have fewer absences and disciplinary incidents, are less likely to repeat a school year, are
more likely to enroll in advanced courses, and are more likely to graduate from high school
in four years.
Kim et al. (2017) argue that rms in countries with weak FTR languages are likely to
engage in less earnings management whose future consequences are perceived to be more
imminent. Their analysis conrms their prediction that rms in countries with weak FTR
engage in less accrual-based and real earnings management than others. Fasan et al. (2016)
nd that rms headquartered in strong-FTR language countries are more likely to engage
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in accrual and real activities earnings management to meet short-term earning benchmarks.
Liang et al. (2014) nd empirical support for the prediction that companies who use strong
FTR languages as their o¢cial working language have less future orientation and perform
worse in future-oriented actions such as corporate social responsibility.
There is also another literature that associates pronoun drop with economic and cultural
outcomes. The pronoun drop reects whether a language permits speakers to drop a per-
sonal pronoun when it is used as the subject of a sentence. Nonpronoun drop languages are
expected to be associated with more individualistic cultures which is known to be positively
associated with economic development as shown in Davis (2016), and Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2011, 2017). In this context, Kashima and Kashima (1998, 2005) nd that cultures
with pronoun drop languages tend to be less Individualistic than those with nonpronoun
drop languages. Davis and Abdurazokzoda (2016) show a statistically signicant negative
e¤ect of the pronoun drop on individualism. Licht et al. (2007) examine the e¤ect of
cultural traits on institutions, such as the rule of law, corruption, and democratic account-
ability. The authors use pronoun drop as an instrument for cultural emphases on autonomy
versus embeddedness. Their analysis shows a signicant inuence of culture, instrumented
by the pronoun drop, on governance. Tabellini (2008) uses a composite linguistic variable
incorporating pronoun drop and politeness form di¤erentiation as an instrument to examine
the connection between generalized morality and the quality of government. The author
nds that countries where generalized morality is more widespread have better governance
indicators.
Languages also di¤er in whether or not they require speakers to grammatically mark
gender. The need to reference gender in languages is argued to inuence personal preferences
and public policies toward gender roles. Davis and Reynolds (2018) nd that speaking
a gendered language is associated with a greater gender gap in educational attainment.
Gay et al. (2017) show that female immigrants who speak a language with sex-based
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grammatical rules exhibit lower labor force participation, hours worked, and weeks worked.
Mavisakalyan (2015) show that where the majority language is gender-intensive have lower
women participation in the labor force, and a higher prevalence of gender-discriminatory
attitudes. Givati and Troiano (2012) nd that the more gender based pronouns a language
has in a country, the shorter the maternity leave that a country provides. Pérez and
Tavits (2019) nd support for the proposition that speakers of genderless languages express
attitudes leaning toward gender equality. Santacreu-Vasut et al. (2013) nd that the
pervasiveness of gender distinctions in grammar is the most signicant determinant of
gender political quota and female participation in politics.
There are other studies that investigate the e¤ect of other linguistic features on economic
outcomes. For instance, Desmet et al. (2012) explore the relationship between linguistic
cleavages and a set of political economy outcomes. The authors nd that deep cleavages,
originating long time ago, are better predictors of conict and redistribution. However,
linguistic distinctions that have arisen more recently lead to better predictors of economic
growth and the provision of public goods. Desmet et al. (2009) investigate the e¤ect of
linguistic diversity on redistribution across countries. Based on linguistic tree diagrams, the
authors introduce distance between languages which is dened as one minus the proportion
of shared branches between two languages out of the maximum number of branches between
any two languages. The authors nd that, once distance between languages is accounted
for, linguistic diversity has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on redistribution.
Compared to this literature, our papers contribution is twofold. The paper is the rst
attempt in the literature to examine the e¤ect on economic development of an institutional
quality that captures the adoption of long-term vision by policy makers in a country. The
second contribution is that it is the rst attempt to use the linguistic characteristics of
languages as an instrument for the institutional adoption of long-term vision.
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3 Data
The countries included in the analysis are: Italy, Canada, Austria, France, Sweden, Israel,
Finland, Netherlands, Spain, Iceland, Denmark, Argentina, Switzerland, Norway, Chile,
Lithuania, Japan, Australia, Portugal, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Ireland, United
Kingdom, Slovak Republic, New Zealand, Estonia, Belgium, Russian Federation, Colombia,
Turkey, Mexico, Czech Republic, Taiwan, Romania, Greece, Slovenia, Thailand, China,
Malaysia, United States, Hong Kong, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, China,
Vietnam, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova, and Angola. The sample is limited due to
the availability of data. The data sources and the summary statistics of the variables used
in the analysis are included in table 1.
The dependent variable is economic development which is proxied by real Gross Domes-
tic Product per capita derived from the Penn World Tables version 8.0. The logarithm of
real Gross Domestic Product per capita is used in the analysis.
3.1 Long-Term Vision
Long Term Vision is derived from the Institutional Proles Database (IPD)1 which is the
outcome of a joint work between the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the
French Ministry for the Economy and Finance (MEF). The IPD database provides estimates
of the institutional characteristics of countries by compiling composite indicators developed
from perception data. This project was designed to stimulate research on the relationship
between institutions, long-term growth and economic development. We use the IPD 2012
database. A detailed description of the data is included in Bertho (2013).
The long-term vision variable is constructed from three questions: (1) "Do public au-
thorities act on a long-term strategic vision?" (2) "Is this strategic vision shared by society
as a whole?" (3) "Do public authorities have the capacity to encourage public and private
1http://www.cepii.fr/institutions/EN/ipd.asp
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actors to act in the direction of this vision? (via tax and nancial incentives, etc.)." For each
question, respondents choose between ve modalities, ranging from 0 (minimum score) to
4 (maximum score). The responses are, thus, discrete ordered variables. In order to ensure
comparability over time, the variables that make up the indicators are aggregated by an
unweighted arithmetic average. This provides us with the long-term vision LTV indicator
that we use in this analysis.
The 2012 edition of the IPD questionnaire contained 330 questions designed to compile
130 indicators. The Institutional Proles survey was sent to country and regional o¢ces
of the French Ministry for the Economy and Finance (MEF) in 143 countries. The ques-
tionnaire was also sent to the agencies of the Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
that have a presence in 48 of those 143 countries. To complete the questionnaire, these two
entities used their own knowledge but also called upon the knowledge of local expertise. In
the 48 countries where both agencies have o¢ces, they were asked to liaise with each other
to produce a consolidated response. Given that this is perception data, considerable e¤ort
has been dedicated to limit the perception bias. The temporal and geographical consistency
of the responses has been systematically checked. The questionnaire was sent out in March
2012, after which the responses had been checked and feedback was sent to the respondents
in September 2012. The nal data were collected by November 2012.
3.2 Instrument
The future-time reference FTR variable is based on a criterion adopted from the European
Science Foundations Typology of Languages in Europe (EUROTYP) project. Chen (2013)
adopts the terminology of "weak-FTR" for languages that do not separate the present from
the future, and call non-weak-FTR languages "strong-FTR." "Inectional FTR" refers
to the presence of any grammatical marking of the future events, even if it is not used
frequently. A detailed description of the data is included in Chen (2013).
9
3.3 Controls
Several control variables are used in the analysis to check the robustness of the results.
These are institutional, geographic, cultural and integration indicators that have been iden-
tied in the literature as confounding factors that explain the variations in the level of
economic development.
Institutional quality is known to have a signicantly favorable e¤ect on economic out-
comes. Ample evidence is provided in Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrick et al. (2004), Asongu and Kodila-Tedika
(2018) and others. For institutional quality, we use the principal component of the vari-
ables: voice and accountability, political stability/no violence, government e¤ectiveness,
regulation quality, corruption-control and rule of law. This indicator is derived from Kau¤-
man et al. (2007) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators. We also include the legal
origin indicators which are compiled by La Porta et al. (1999). The list2 includes the
British common law, the French civil law, the Socialist law, the German civil law, and the
Scandinavian law. The authors argue that the legal tradition in countries implanted by
colonial powers has profoundly shaped national approaches to property rights protection
and the degree to which the state intervenes in the economy. Accordingly, the legal origin
is expected to have a signicant inuence on economic development. We also use a dummy
variable for countries with a communist past which is expected to have a negative e¤ect on
economic development.
We include schooling or educational attainment, which is measured by the average years
of schooling amongst the population aged 15 and over. This is derived from the international
educational attainment data set in Barro and Lee (2010). Some studies include education in
income regressions as in Easterly and Levine (2016). We also include cultural and linguistic
indicators such as individualism from Hofstede (2001), and the pronoun drop from Dryer
2http://scholar.harvard.edu/schleifer/publications/quality-government
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(2011). Our literature survey refers to some studies that nd an association between these
cultural indicators and economic development.
We also include geographic variables such as the historical pathogen prevalence from
Fincher et al. (2008), a dummy if the country is landlocked and mean temperature from
Michalopoulus and Ashraf (2015). Gallup et al. (1999) show that location and climate
have large e¤ects on income levels.
Another control variable used is openness which is proxied by (Exports + Imports)/GDP
derived from the World Development Indicators. There are several studies that provide
evidence for the e¤ect of openness on economic outcomes such as Sachs and Warner (1995),
Dollar and Kraay (2003, 2004), Frankel and Romer (1999), and others. Finally, the analysis
also includes continental dummies for Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceania, and the Americas.
4 Estimation
4.1 Baseline Results
This section empirically estimates the e¤ect of long-term vision on economic development
as follows
RGDPi =  + LTVi +Xi + "i (1)
where RGDPi is the logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product per capita in country i.
LTVi is long-term vision in country i, and Xi is a vector of control variables. The purpose
of the equation, which is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, is to assess if long-term
vision is associated with economic development. Figure 1 shows a positive association be-
tween the logarithm of real GDP per capita and long-term vision. Table 2 includes the
baseline results. The results without any control variables is included in column 1. We
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add schooling in column 2, the communist indicator in column 3, openness in column 4,
institutional quality in column 5, and the continental dummies in column 6. The results
show that long-term vision has a statistically signicant positive association with economic
development. This result is robust even after the inclusion of control variables such as edu-
cational attainment, institutional quality, openness, whether the country has a communist
past, and the continental dummies. It is worth noting that as we include more control
variables, the size and the signicance of the coe¢cient of long-term vision diminish. The
last column that includes all the control variables show a statistically signicant coe¢cient
of 0:182. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in long-term vision translates
into an increase in the logarithm of real GDP per capita by 0:141.
As expected, schooling has a signicantly positive association with economic develop-
ment. On the other hand, the communist indicator has a statistically signicant negative
coe¢cient. The openness and institutional indicators, however, do not have statistically
signicant e¤ects on economic development. The insignicant e¤ect of the institutional
indicator could be attributed to the fact that the institutional qualities that are essential
for economic performance are already captured in our long-term vision institutional vari-
able. The insignicant coe¢cient of openness is consistent with the ndings of Dollar and
Kraay (2003) who argue that the e¤ect of trade and institutions on economic outcomes is
uninformative because of the high correlation between these two variables.
4.2 Controlling for Outliers
In order to detect and deal with possible outliers, our empirical estimation follows the
iteratively reweighted least squares estimation developed by Huber (1973) and the MM-
estimator proposed by Yohai (1987). These techniques are used to mitigate the e¤ect of
outliers. The results after controlling for the outliers are included in table 3 in columns 1
and 2, respectively. The evidence shows a statistically signicant positive e¤ect of long-term
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vision on economic development. We also use the procedure proposed by Hadi (1992) to
detect and control for outliers. The following outliers are detected and excluded, namely:
Hong Kong. The results in column 3 of table 3 show that, controlling for outliers, long-
term vision has a statistically signicant positive association with economic development.
This implies that these di¤erent corrections do not a¤ect the results found so far. In
di¤erent terms, the outliers have no real impact on the direction, sign or signicance of the
relationship of interest.
4.3 Potential Endogeneity
Given the potential endogeneity problem, a two stage least squares regression is conducted
to address the question of whether long-term vision, instrumented by the FTR indicator,
has an e¤ect on economic development. The two stage estimation equations are as follows
Second Stage: RGDPi =  + LTVi +Xi + "i (2)
First Stage: LTVi = FTRi + i (3)
The error terms in the rst and second stage regressions are "i and i, respectively.
The FTRi variables are considered excluded exogenous variables in that they are used
as instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of LTVi but are excluded
in the second stage. Table 4 shows the coe¢cients of the second stage of the two stage
least squares. Column 1 shows the results of the entire sample, while column 2 shows the
results after the exclusion of the outliers. The results show that the exogenous component
of long-term vision signicantly explains economic development even after the inclusion of
the control variables and with the exclusion of the outliers. It is worth noting that the size
and signicance of the coe¢cient of the long-term vision variable improved in the two stage
least squares estimation compared to the ordinary least squares estimation. The two stage
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least squares estimation show a statistically signicant coe¢cient of 0:405 for long-term
vision. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in long-term vision translates
into an increase in the logarithm of real GDP per capita by 0:315.
It is worth mentioning that for the instrument to be valid, it should a¤ect economic
development through its impact on long-term vision and not through any other channel.
To address the exclusion restriction, we control for alternative channels through which the
instrument can a¤ect economic development, other than through long-term vision. Some
of the key channels would be schooling and institutional quality. Forward looking societies
will invest more in human capital and will improve the quality of their institutions. As
shown in table 4, the results are robust even after we control for these variables. Another
way to deal with this issue is to conduct tests of overidentifying restriction which has as
its null hypothesis that FTR does not explain the logarithm of real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct per capita beyond the ability of FTR to explain long-term vision. In this context,
the overidentifying restriction tests, included in table 4, do not reject the hypothesis that
the instruments can be excluded from the second stage regression. This implies that the
FTR can not explain cross country variations in economic development beyond their abil-
ity to explain cross country variations in long-term vision that is conducive to economic
development.
4.4 Additional Controls
To test the robustness of our results, we add other control variables that are identied in the
literature as determinants of economic development. Thus, we add to our baseline estima-
tions individualism, the pronoun drop, mean temperature, historical pathogen prevalence,
legal origins, and a dummy if the country is landlocked. The estimations are included in ta-
ble 5. The results show that our previous ndings are robust as the coe¢cient of long-term
vision is statistically signicant and positive in all specications, except in the last column
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when we include the legal origin. This could be attributed to the fact that institutional
long-term orientation could be incorporated into the legal system adopted by the country.
In table 6, we include combinations of control variables that have been considered in
some previous studies. In column 1 of table 6, we include the control variables included
in Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). The list of controls include a dummy for landlocked
countries, the percentage of population practicing the major religion in a country, and
absolute values of countries longitude and latitude. In column 2 of table 6, we include the
list of controls in Ashraf and Galor (2013) which include log percentage of arable land, log
absolute latitude, log land suitability for agriculture and a continental dummy. In column 3
of table 6, we add the list of controls in Easterly and Levine (2016) which include the legal
origin, independence and ethnicity. The results in table 6 conrm our previous ndings
as long-term vision has a statistically signicant and positive association with economic
development in all specications.
It is also worthnoting that the overidentifying restriction tests, included in tables 5 and
6, imply that the FTR can not explain cross country variations in economic development
beyond their ability to explain cross country variations in long-term vision that is conducive
to economic development.
4.5 Channels of Transmission
Finally, we explore the channels of transmission from long-term vision to economic devel-
opment. We consider possible transmission through the channels of education, innovation
and investment. The intuition is that if policy makers adopt a long-term vision, they are
more likely to invest in human capital, physical capital and technological progress. Table
7 includes the results where the dependent variable is schooling in column 1, innovation in
column 2 and investment in column 3. Educational attainment is measured by the average
years of schooling amongst the population aged 15 and over. We use the number of tele-
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phone subscriptions per 1,000 population to proxy for infrastructure development, which
is essential for investment. This variable is derived from the World Development Indica-
tors. We also use the number of researchers in R&D per million as a proxy for innovation.
This variable is also derived from the World Development Indicators. Table 7 shows that
long-term vision has a statistically signicant positive e¤ect on education and innovation,
but the e¤ect on investment is insignicant. This implies that when policy makers adopt a
long-term vision they are more likely to invest in human capital and to spend on research
and development.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ect of the adoption of long-term vision of policy makers on
economic development. The results of ordinary least squares estimations show that the
adoption of a long-term vision has a statistically signicant positive association with eco-
nomic development. These results are robust even after the inclusion of control variables.
However, the key di¢culty in estimating a causal e¤ect is that long-term vision is endoge-
nous to economic development. Therefore, we have to use instrumental variables. The
instruments used are the FTR language variables introduced by Chen (2013). To deal with
potential endogeneity, the paper conducts two stage least squares estimations. The results
show that long-term vision, instrumented by the linguistic characteristics indicators, ex-
plains cross country variations in economic development. These results are also robust even
after the inclusion of additional control variables that are identied by the literature as
determinants of economic development, and after the exclusion of outliers. The paper also
nds that the e¤ect of long-term vision on economic development goes through the chan-
nels of education and innovation. Future research can distinguish and compare between
the economic e¤ects of long-term vision of policy makers with that of the population. A
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comparison between the e¤ects of the two is warranted in order to determine which matters
more especially in cases when the two do not coincide.
References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson (2005). "Unbundling Institutions." Journal of
Political Economy, 113(5): 949-995.
[2] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2001). "The Colonial Ori-
gins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." American Economic
Review, 91 (5): 1369-1401.
[3] Ashraf, Quamrul, and Oded Galor (2013). "The Out of Africa Hypothesis, Human
Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development." American Economic Re-
view, 103(1): 1-46.
[4] Asongu, Simplice and Oasis Kodila-Tedika (2018). "Institutions and Poverty: A
Critical Comment Based on Evolving Currents and Debates," Social Indicators Re-
search: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measure-
ment, 139(1), 99-117.
[5] Barro, Robert, and JongWha Lee (2013). "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment
in the World, 1950-2010." Journal of Development Economics, 104: 184-198.
[6] Bertho, Fabien. "Presentation of the Institutional Proles Database 2012." Document
de travail de la DG Tresor 2013/03.
[7] Chen, Keith (2013). "The E¤ect of Language on Economic Behavior: Evidence from
Savings Rates, Health Behaviors, and Retirement Assets." American Economic Review,
103(2): 690-731.
17
[8] Davis, Lewis (2016). " Individual Responsibility and Economic Development: Evidence
from Rainfall Data." Kyklos, 69(3): 426-470.
[9] Davis, Lewis and Farangis Abdurazokzoda (2014). "Language, Culture and Institu-
tions: Evidence from a New Linguistic Dataset." Journal of Comparative Economics,
44: 541-561.
[10] Davis, Lewis and Megan Reynolds (2018). "Gendered Language and the Educational
Gender Gap." Economics Letters, 168 :46-48.
[11] Desmet, Klaus, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín and Romain Wacziarg (2012). "The Political
Economy of Linguistic Cleavages." Journal of Development Economics, 97: 322-338.
[12] Desmet, Klaus, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín and Shlomo Weber (2009). "Linguistic Diversity
and Redistribution." Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(6):12911318.
[13] Dollar, David and Aart Kraay (2003). "Institutions, Trade, and Growth." Journal of
Monetary Economics, 50: 133162.
[14] Dollar, Dollar and Aart Kraay (2004). "Trade, Growth, and Poverty." The Economic
Journal, 114: F22-F49.
[15] Dryer, Matthew (2011)."Expression of Pronominal Subjects." In: Dryer, Matthew S.
& Haspelmath, Martin (eds.) The World Atlas Of Language Structures Online . Max
Planck Digital Library.
[16] Easterly, William and Ross Levine (2016). "The European Origins of Economic De-
velopment." Journal of Economic Growth, 21:225257.
[17] Falk, Armin, Anke Becker, Thomas Dohmen, Benjamin Enke, David Hu¤man, Uwe
Sunde (2018). "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences." The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 133(4): 16451692.
18
[18] Fasan, Marco, Giorgio Gotti, Tony Kang, and Yi Liu (2016). "Language FTR and
Earnings Management: International Evidence." SSRN 2763922.
[19] Feenstra, Robert, Robert Inklaar and Marcel Timmer (2015). "The Next Generation
of the Penn World Table." American Economic Review, 105(10): 3150-3182.
[20] Figlio, David, Paola Giuliano, Umut Özek, and Paola Sapienza (2019). "Long-Term
Orientation and Educational Performance." American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 11(4): 272-309.
[21] Fincher, Corey, Randy Thornhill, DamianMurray, andMark Schalle (2008). "Pathogen
Prevalence Predicts Human Cross-cultural Variability in Individualism/Collectivism."
Proceedings of the Royal Society, 275: 12791285.
[22] Frankel, Je¤rey and David Romer (1999). "Does Trade Cause Growth?" American
Economic Review, 89(3): 379-399.
[23] Gallup, John Luke, Je¤rey Sachs, and Andrew Millinger (1999). "Geography and Eco-
nomic Development." International Regional Science Review, 22(2): 179232.
[24] Galor, Oded, and Ömer Özak (2016). "The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference."
American Economic Review, 106 (10): 3064-3103.
[25] Galor, Oded, Ömer Özak and Assaf Sarid (2017). "Geographical Origins and Economic
Consequences of Language Structures." Manuscript.
[26] Gay, Victor, Daniel Hicks, Estefania Santacreu-Vasut and Amir Shoham (2018). "De-
composing culture: an analysis of gender, language, and labor supply in the house-
hold." Review of Economics of the Household, 16(4): 879909.
19
[27] Givati, Yehonatan, and Ugo Troiano (2012). "Law, Economics, and Culture: Theory
of Mandated Benets and Evidence from Maternity Leave Policies." The Journal of
Law & Economics, 55(2): 339-364.
[28] Gorodnichenko, Yuriy and Gerard Roland (2011). "Which Dimensions of Culture Mat-
ter for Long-Run Growth?" American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 101:3,
492498.
[29] Gorodnichenko, Yuriy and Gerard Roland (2017). "Culture, Institutions, and the
Wealth of Nations." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 99(3): 402416.
[30] Hadi, Ali (1992). "Identifying Multiple Outliers in Multivariate Data." Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, 54(3): 761771.
[31] Hofstede, Geert (2001). Cultures Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, In-
stitutions and Organizations across Nations. second ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
[32] Huber, Peter (1973). "Robust Regression: Asymptotics, Conjectures and Monte
Carlo." The Annals of Statistics 1: 799-821.
[33] Hubner, Malte and Gonzague Vannoorenberghe (2015a). "Patience and Long-run
Growth." Economics Letters, 137: 163-167.
[34] Hubner, Malte and Gonzague Vannoorenberghe (2015b). "Patience and Ination."
Manuscript.
[35] Kashima, Emiko, and Yoshihisa Kashima (1998). "Culture and Language: The Case
of Cultural Dimensions and Personal Pronoun Use." Journal of Cross-Cultural Psy-
chology, 29(3); 461-486.
20
[36] Kashima, Emiko, and Yoshihisa Kashima (2005). "Erratum to Kashima and Kashima
(1998) and Reiteration." Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(3): 396-400.
[37] Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007). "Governance Matters
VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006." World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 4280.
[38] Kim, Jaehyeon, Yongtae Kim and Jian Zhou (2017). "Languages and Earnings Man-
agement." Journal of Accounting and Economics, 63(23): 288-306.
[39] Knack, Stephan and Philip Keefer (1997). "Why Dont Poor Countries Catch Up? A
Cross National Test of an Institutional Explanation." Economic Inquiry, 35: 590-602.
[40] Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer (1995). "Institutions and Economic Performance:
Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures." Economics and Poli-
tics, 7 (3): 207-225.
[41] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny
(1999). "The Quality of Government." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
15 (1): 222-279.
[42] Liang, Hao, Christopher Marquis, Luc Renneboog, and Sunny Li Sun (2014). "Speak-
ing of Corporate Social Responsibility." Manuscript.
[43] Licht, Amir, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom Schwartz (2007). "Culture Rules: The
Foundations of the Rule of Law and other Norms of Governance." Journal of Compar-
ative Economics 35: 659688.
[44] Maviskalyan, Astghik (2015). "Gender in Language and Gender in Employment." Ox-
ford Development Studies, 43(4): 403-424.
21
[45] Michalopoulus, Stelios and Quamrul Ashraf (2015). "Climatic Fluctuations and the
Di¤usion of Agriculture." Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(3): 589-609.
[46] Pérez, Efrén and Margit Tavits (2019). "Language Inuences Public Attitudes toward
Gender Equality." The Journal of Politics, 81(1):
[47] Rodrick, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi (2004). "Institutions Rule:
The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Develop-
ment." Journal of Economic Growth, 9: 131-165.
[48] Sutter, Matthias, Silvia Angerer, Daniela G¨latzle-Rützler, and Philipp Lergetporer
(2018). "Language Group Di¤erences in Time Preferences: Evidence from Primary
School Children in a Bilingual City." European Economic Review, 106: 2134.
[49] Sachs, Je¤ery and Andrew Warner (1995). "Economic Reform and the Process of
Global Integration." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1-118.
[50] Santacreu-Vasut, Estefania, Amir Shoham, and Victor Gay (2013). "Do Female/Male
Distinctions in Language Matter? Evidence from Gender Political Quotas." Applied
Economics Letters, 20(5): 495-498.
[51] Tabellini, Guido (2008). "Presidential Address: Institutions and Culture." Journal of
the European Economic Association, 6(23):255294.
[52] Yohai, Victor (1987). "High Breakdown-point and High E¢ciency Estimates for Re-
gression." The Annals of Statistics 15: 642-665.
22
Variable Observations Mean Standard Min Max Source
Deviation
GDP per capita 50 9.790 0.747 8.088 11.173 Feenstra et al. (2015)
LTV 49 2.599 0.779 1 4 Bertho (2013)
Schooling 46 9.940 1.612 5.747 12.749 Barro & Lee (2010)
Communist 47 0.298 0.462 0 1 Authors
Openness 50 103.508 64.200 26.933 384.865 WDI
Institutions 51 1.531 2.401 -3.364 4.592 Kau¤man et al. (2007)
Africa 52 0.038 0.194 0 1 Authors
Americas 52 0.115 0.323 0 1 Authors
Asia 52 0.231 0.425 0 1 Authors
Europe 52 0.577 0.499 0 1 Authors
Oceania 52 0.038 0.194 0 1 Authors
Individualism 45 51.355 23.025 13 91 Hofstede (2001)
Historical Pathogen 45 -0.3284 0.67 -1.31 1.03 Fincher et al. (2008)
Pronoun drop 47 0.595 0.4960 0 1 Dryer (2011)
Legor_UK 51 0.196 0.401 0 1 La Porta et al. (1999)
Legor_FR 51 0.294 0.460 0 1 La Porta et al. (1999)
Legor_SO 51 0.313 0.468 0 1 La Porta et al. (1999)
Legor_GE 51 0.098 0.300 0 1 La Porta et al. (1999)
Legor_SC 51 0.098 0.300 0 1 La Porta et al. (1999)
Landlock 52 0.153 0.364 0 1 Authors
Mean Temperature 22 14.896 8.665 -7.633 26.114 Michalopoulus
& Ashraf (2015)
Table 1: Statistical Summaries
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I II III IV V VI
LTV 0.388*** 0.274*** 0.213*** 0.205*** 0.159** 0.182**
(0.094) (0.076) (0.068) (0.068) (0.077) (0.077)
Schooling 0.218*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.180*** 0.171***
(0.046) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.032)
Communist -0.592*** -0.609*** -0.547*** -0.761***
(0.107) (0.109) (0.115) (0.100)
Openness 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutions 0.046 0.001
(0.033) (0.026)
Continental No No No No No Yes
Constant 8.775*** 7.014*** 7.579*** 7.544*** 7.710*** 7.614***
(0.251) (0.432) (0.369) (0.372) (0.397) (0.402)
Observations 48 44 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.176 0.551 0.718 0.725 0.747 0.838
Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Estimations.
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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IRWLS MM Hadi
LTV 0.183*** 0.143** 0.175**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.079)
Schooling 0.176*** 0.204*** 0.178***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Communist -0.786*** -0.813*** -0.715***
(0.117) (0.069) (0.094)
Open 0.001 -0.001** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Institutions -0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.028) (0.024) (0.023)
Continental Yes Yes Yes
Constant 7.572*** 7.436*** 7.618***
(0.412) (0.399) (0.386)
Observations 43 43 42
R-squared 0.818 0.858
Table 3: Controlling for Outliers
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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2SLS 2SLS without outliers
LTV 0.405** 0.399**
(0.193) (0.189)
Schooling 0.152*** 0.158***
(0.031) (0.033)
Communist -0.747*** -0.705***
(0.086) (0.086)
Open 0.002* -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Institutions -0.033 -0.030
(0.034) (0.033)
Continental Yes Yes
Constant 7.345*** 7.349***
(0.437) (0.421)
Observations 43 42
R-squared 0.773 0.790
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 0.130 0.130
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 0.939 0.908
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.949 0.951
Tests of overidentifying restrictions:
Sargan N*R-sq test (p-value) 0.929 0.952
Basmann test (p-value) 0.947 0.965
Table 4: Two Stage Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita
Instruments: FTR, inectional FTR
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
26
I II III IV
LTV 0.304* 0.234** 0.478* 0.177
(0.168) (0.105) (0.255) (0.129)
Individualism -0.000
(0.004)
Pronoun Drop -0.045
(0.139)
Mean Temperature -0.071
(0.058)
Historical Pathogen 0.854
(0.907)
Landlock 0.159
(0.164)
Legal Origin No No No Yes
Basline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 7.537*** 9.480*** 7.238*** 7.808***
(0.416) (2.040) (0.516) (0.466)
Observations 39 14 43 43
R-squared 0.830 0.959 0.706 0.846
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 6.325 3.540 4.695 0.227
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 0.613 1.296 0.807 1.096
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.536 0.004 0.500 0.402
Tests of overidentifying restrictions:
Sargan N*R-sq test (p-value) 0.660 0.004 0.875 0.500
Basmann test (p-value) 0.746 0.098 0.908 0.617
Table 5: Additional Control Variables
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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I II III
LTV 0.226* 0.753*** 1.065***
(0.116) (0.269) (0.410)
Control Variables Gorodnichenko Ashraf Easterly
& Roland (2017) & Galor (2013) & Levine (2016)
Constant 7,206*** 7.961*** 7.017
(1.697) 0.834 1.225
Observations 47 45 45
R-squared 0.936 0.997 0.993
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 0.163 0.033 0.058
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 1.494 2.123 2.707
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.850 0.636 0.140
Tests of overidentifying restrictions:
Sargan N*R-sq test (p-value) 0.691 0.636 0.289
Basmann test (p-value) 0.799 0.705 0.330
Table 6: Additional Control Variables in the Literature
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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Schooling Innovation Investment
LTV 0.605*** 348.940* 3.162
(0.207) (200.157) 2.329
Continental E¤ect Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.638*** 292.175 1.971
(0.574) (628.306) 4.020
Observations 113 80 93
R-squared 0.561 0.115 0.082
Table 7: Channels of Transmission
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
Figure 1: Long-term vision and the logarithm of real GDP per capita.
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